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1 Introduction
We introduce a new assumption in an otherwise standard Downsian model of two party electoral compe-
tition in order to account for the voterslack of information about the electoral platforms proposed by
the candidates. Specically we assume that after both candidates announce simultaneously their policy
positions, voters can only observe the announced platformsrelative positions on the policy space. That
is, voters only know whether both candidates have chosen the same position, or if that is not the case,
which candidate has chosen the most leftist or rightist position.
We show that with this modication the median voter result does not apply. In fact, our modied
version of the standard Downsian model leads to some extreme and unexpected results. We nd that
when the votersonly information is the relative position of the candidateschoices on the policy space,
the strategic response of the candidates is to choose the most extreme policies. Clearly, if there is any
reason why candidatesmay expect that being leftist o¤ers an electoral advantage, all candidates will
want to convince the voters that they are the most leftist ones and this will drive them to converge to
an extreme position. However, when we break the symmetry of the candidates by introducing a small
advantage for one of them, the strategic response of the candidates is still extreme but divergent: it drives
each candidates policy choice to a di¤erent end of the policy space.
The assumption that voters do not have as much information as candidates about the policy choices
makes the model more realistic. In political science there exists a whole literature which tries to estimate
the policy platforms of elected o¢ cials (see for example Mikhailov et al. 2012; Lowe et al. 2011; Benoit
et al. 2009; Laver et al. 2003; Laver and Garry 2000). The existence of this literature alone is su¢ cient
to back up the assumption that votersinformation about candidatespolicy platforms is far from being
perfect. Moreover, Adams et al. (2011) document that voters react very poorly to partiesLeft-Right
policy shifts during an electoral campaign but very strongly to alterations in parties policy images,
which are usually shaped by interest groups endorsements. Notice that interest group endorsements
o¤er to voters information only about the relative position of candidates, exactly as in this papers
working assumption. That is, the idea that the information that voters have when casting a ballot is not
just imperfect but, also, mainly relative, seems to have a sound empirical support. Finally, it is worth
noting that many studies which try to estimate votersawareness of American politics consider that a
respondent is aware of candidatesdi¤erences if, given a specic policy issue, she can correctly identify
which candidate, out of two, is more conservative (Layman and Carsey 2002). That is, the imperfect
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information that we consider in this paper that voters have about candidates platforms is regarded
enough by the aforementioned studies to characterize a voter as being aware of candidatesdi¤erences. In
reality, no more than 80% of the voters can correctly determine which is the most conservative candidate
in any given issue and any given election (Table 1, Layman and Carsey 2002). Hence, the imperfect
information scenario that we consider here might be richer, not poorer, than the actual information that
voters hold.
The particular set-up that we analyze requires the analysis of a game of imperfect information: voters
cannot perfectly observe the strategies chosen by the candidates. We use the solution concept of sequential
equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982) and we apply a very mild renement (Marx and Swinkels 1997) that
focuses on undominated strategies to derive a unique equilibrium in terms of the candidatesstrategies.
We assume that during the electoral campaign voters receive a signal that depends on the candidates
policy choices. If candidate A chooses a policy that is to the left of the policy chosen by candidate B,
then the voters receive a signal that tells them only that candidate As policy choice is more leftist than
candidate Bs, but they do not receive any information about the precise location of the candidatespolicy
choices, nor they know how close they are to their own ideal points. Similarly, if candidate A chooses
a policy that is to the right of the policy chosen by candidate B, then the voters receive a signal that
tells them only that: candidate As policy choice is more rightist than candidate Bs. Finally, if both
candidates have chosen the same policy position, then the voters receive a signal that tells them exactly
that, but they do not receive any information about the precise location of the candidatespolicy choice.
Thus, there are only three kinds of signals that the voter may receive: "candidate A is the most leftist",
"candidate A is the most rightist", and "both candidates have exactly the same platform."
After receiving the signal, a voter has to compute the expected utility that she derives from each
candidate, taking into account only her own beliefs about the candidates choices given the observed
signal. She will vote for the candidate from whom she obtains the largest expected utility. We nd that,
given the equilibrium choices of the candidates, a voters optimal choice is always the following: if her
ideal point is leftist (smaller than 1/2) then she votes for the most leftist candidate, and if her ideal point
is rightist (larger than 1/2) then she votes for the most rightist candidate. Thus, the behavior of the voter
is not surprising at all given the kind of information available.
We also generalize the standard Downsian model by allowing one of the candidates to have a small
valence advantage. In particular, we assume that when the voter is indi¤erent between the two candidates,
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she votes for candidate A with some xed probability that is always equal or larger than 1/2, and she
votes for candidate B with the remaining probability (smaller or equal to 1/2). The larger the probability
bias that the voter holds for candidate A in case of indi¤erence, the larger the advantage that candidate
A enjoys.
We nd that the size of the advantage plays a major role in determining the features of the equilibrium
strategies. If the size of the advantage is small, that is, if the probability with which the indi¤erent voters
vote for candidate A is close to 1/2, then in equilibrium both candidates will choose policies that converge
to one of the extremes of the policy space: the most leftist if the median voter is expected to have leftist
ideal point, and the most rightist if the median voter is expected to have a rightist ideal point. In this
equilibrium both candidatesuse pure strategies.
However, for large values of the advantage, candidatespolicy choices in equilibrium do not converge.
In this case, if the median voter is expected to have a leftist ideal point, then in equilibrium the advantaged
candidate will choose extreme leftist policies and the disadvantaged candidate will choose extreme rightist
policies, whereas if the median voter is expected to have a rightist ideal point, then in equilibrium the
advantaged candidate will choose extreme rightist policies and the disadvantaged candidate will choose
extreme leftist policies. In this equilibrium both candidates use mixed strategies with full support that are
symmetric with respect to each other. The density function corresponding to each equilibrium strategy is
increasing with respect to the policy for one candidate and decreasing for the other, that is, in equilibrium
each candidate assigns increasing amounts of probability to a di¤erent extreme of the policy space.
Thus, even though all the equilibria involve extreme policy positions, we nd equilibria of two di¤erent
kinds: convergent equilibria for small advantage sizes and divergent equilibria for large advantage sizes.
The size of the valence advantage is considered small or large relative to the bias of the distribution of
the ideal point of the median voter. That is, the larger the bias of the distribution of the median voters
ideal point, the larger the advantaged needed to have a divergent equilibrium. Notice that the relevance
of the valence advantage to the voters decision is always minimal (independently of its size) in the sense
that it plays a role only when a voter is indi¤erent between the policy choices of the two candidates.
The intuition behind these results can be found combining the forces that make candidates choose
divergent policies because one of them enjoys an advantage (for instance, as in Aragonès and Palfrey 2002
and Aragonès and Xefteris 2012), with those that make candidates choose extreme policies because voters
will only react to some signals about their relative policy choices. When the candidates believe that the
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median voter has an extreme leftist ideal point, that is, when the uncertainty about the location of the
median voter ideal point is small, then the e¤ect of the advantage is reduced and the candidatesstrategies
in equilibrium are mainly driven by the aim to satisfy the median voter. In this case candidatespolicy
choices will tend to converge. Since the median voter will only react to their relative locations, they will
converge to the extreme policy that is expected to be the most preferred by the median voter.
Otherwise, when uncertainty about the location of the median voter ideal point is large, candidates do
not have a clear strategy that satises the median voter, and the e¤ect of the advantage is back in place
(even if the advantage only plays a role when the voter is indi¤erent policy-wise). The equilibrium in this
case shows di¤erentiation between candidatesplatforms for the same reasons that explain equilibrium
policy di¤erentiation in the existing models of electoral competition with an advantaged candidate. In
those models, the advantaged candidate chooses more centrist policies (preferred by the median voter),
and the disadvantaged candidate chooses more extreme policies from both ends of the policy space (less
preferred by the median voter). In our case, the fact that a voter only reacts to the relative position of
the candidates, forces both candidates to choose extreme policies from di¤erent ends of the policy space,
thus the di¤erentiation in this case is extreme.
As in the existing literature on models with advantaged candidates, we nd that in all the cases
analyzed before, the candidate that enjoys the advantage obtains larger payo¤s in equilibrium, and these
payo¤s increase with the size of the advantage. In addition, we nd that when the advantage is large, the
advantaged candidates payo¤s increase with the bias of the distribution of the ideal point of the median
voter. Otherwise, if the distribution of the median voters ideal point is symmetric, the candidates
equilibrium strategies are identical and the di¤erence between the payo¤s of the two candidates is very
small. Regarding voterswelfare we nd that voters are better o¤ when the size of the advantage is larger
(relative to the bias), because for larger advantages sizes the expected policy outcome is less extreme.
Our results are computed on a discrete policy space (a nite number of equidistant policies). This
assumption is irrelevant for the small advantage size case because the equilibrium is in pure strategies.
But it is important for the large advantage case when the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. In this
case, when the number of policies increases, the strategies of the candidates assign larger amounts of
probability to extreme policies, and in the limit, when the number of policies approaches innite, they
converge to extreme and divergent pure strategies. Furthermore, as the number of policies increases the
direct e¤ect of the size of the advantage on the payo¤s disappears, while its indirect e¤ect (the size of the
advantage compared to the probability that the median voter is leftist determines whether an equilibrium
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is convergent or not) still a¤ects the probability of winning of each candidate. In the concluding section
of the paper we argue that an extension of our results to a continuous policy space is straightforward.
We also compare our set-up and results to the existing models of electoral competition with an ad-
vantaged candidate where instead of dening the advantage as a larger probability of obtaining the vote
from an indi¤erent voter, it is dened as an extra xed amount of utility (Groseclose 2001). We nd that
the conventional model with an advantaged candidate can be embedded in our setup if we assume that
the indi¤erent voter always votes for the advantaged candidate (probability one). Since we cover a larger
set of possibilities, our model is a generalization of the conventional one.
Finally, we check the robustness of the informational setting by introducing a proportion of well
informed voters1. We show that increasing the proportion of informed voters reduces the extremism
of the candidatesstrategies and increases voterswelfare. We also nd that introducing small enough
proportions of informed voters in our otherwise misinformed electorate we obtain equilibrium strategies
that are very similar to the ones described above and as the proportion of informed voters approaches zero
the equilibrium strategies converge to the ones corresponding to the setup with a complete misinformed
electorate. We also show that the degree of extremism of the policy outcome increases with the voters
lack of information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we relate our results to the existing
literature. In Section 3 we describe the formal model. Section 4 is devoted to characterize the equilibria.
In section 5 we discuss the features of the equilibria. Section 6 compares the results obtained here with
those from the conventional model of an advantage candidate and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
The assumption that voters only observe the relative position of candidates in the policy space is not
new in the economics and political science literature. The paper most closely related to the informational
set-up of our paper is one by McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985). Like us, they also consider that voters
only have relative information about candidatesplatforms but, unlike us, they consider that voters have
very good information about the policy preferences of their fellow citizens (each voter knows exactly how
many voters have ideal policies to the left of her ideal policy and how many voters have ideal policies to
1Alternatively, this assumption could be interpreted as if, with some probability, all voters are correctly informed about
the candidates policy choices.
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the right of her ideal policy) and that each voter believes that all other voters are perfectly informed about
the policy platforms of the candidates. That is, they withdraw some information from one dimension of
the standard Downsian model (awareness of the exact location of candidatesplatforms) while they add
some information on another dimension of the model (distribution of fellow citizenspolicy preferences)
and some extra behavioral assumptions (belief that everybody else is perfectly informed) and they show
that the median voter result is robust to this specication. Our analysis will demonstrate that, without
the aforementioned informational additions of McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985), relative information
about candidatesplatforms leads to policy choices far from the median.
Another paper that is related to ours is one by Gul and Pesendorfer (2009) who consider the pos-
sibility of voters being ignorant about the policy choice of a candidate in a binary policy framework
with heterogeneous (in terms of non-policy characteristics) candidates. They consider that voters are
homogeneous in terms of policy preferences and heterogeneous in terms of which candidates non-policy
characteristics they value more, and they show that candidate di¤erentiation could be encountered in the
equilibrium of this model. That is, they also argue that lack of information about candidate platforms
may result in non-convergent candidate behavior when candidates are heterogeneous. The binary nature
of their policy space, though, cannot provide answers on whether this lack of information leads to mod-
erate candidate behavior (only mild di¤erentiation around some notion of a center of the policy space) or
to completely extremist behavior. Moreover, the assumption that all voters are homogeneous in terms of
policy preferences makes their analysis depart to a great extent from the standard Downsian framework
of analysis. Our results reinforce their ndings (in the sense that policy di¤erentiation could be due to
lack of voters information about candidatespolicy platforms), and complement them by establishing
that di¤erentiation, whenever it occurs, is (nearly) maximal.
Our results also o¤er new arguments in favor of the standard theory of voting (a voters utility from
a certain policy is decreasing in the distance between this policy and her ideal policy) when compared
to the, so-called, theory of directional voting (see for example Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). In
brief, directional voting assumes that a voters utility from a certain policy is decreasing (increasing) in
the distance between this policy and the left extreme when the voters ideal policy is located in the left
(right) half of the policy axis. The assumptions of these models are, obviously, incompatible with basic
rational behavior assumptions but their proponents argue that they exhibit a better t with real elections
observations (they predict non-moderate candidate behavior) than the standard model (which predicts
moderate candidate behavior).2 In this paper we consider a variation of the standard Downsian model
2One should stress here that there is no consensus in empirical literature that directional voting ts with the data better
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(we just replace the assumption of perfect information about candidatesplatforms with one of imperfect
information) and we show that non-moderate candidate behavior (convergent or divergent) is the most
reasonable outcome. Hence, the alleged better-tof the directional voting theory with the data when
compared to the standard theory of voting need not be due to voters actually behaving in the unintuitive
manner that directional voting considers but due to the fact that the information that voters hold is
imperfect.
Theoretical literature based on the standard Downsian model (at least as far as voters behavior
is concerned) o¤ers various alternative explanations for the observed non-moderate candidate platform
choices in two-candidate elections. Palfrey (1984) considers the variation of the standard model in which
the two candidates face the potential entry of a third candidate and he shows that this makes the two
main candidates di¤erentiate to a great extent. Roemer (1994), in the context of the Calvert (1985)
and Wittman (1977) variation of the Downsian model (candidates with policy preferences), shows that
when candidates are imperfectly informed about voterspreferences, non-moderate and divergent behavior
can be also encountered. Finally, Grosser and Palfrey (2013) show that extremist equilibria arise in the
citizen-candidate model when playersideal policies are private information while Glaeser et al. (2005)
suggest that the observed extremist positioning of candidates can be attributed to the fact that candidates
need to induce their core constituencies to actively support them (or to make donations) and, hence, they
deviate away from moderate behavior. The present paper complements this literature by o¤ering a new
explanation.
3 The model
There are two candidates, A and B; that compete in an election. The policy space X is the set of n
points on the [0; 1] interval, xk = k 1n 1 , k = 1; 2; : : : ; n. Before the election, candidates simultaneously
choose policy platforms xA and xB respectively from the policy space X. Each candidates objective is
to maximize his probability of winning the election. We assume full commitment of the candidates to the
chosen platforms.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a unique voter who has preferences over policies
represented by a utility function um (x) =  (jx  xmj) where  () is strictly decreasing with respect to
jx  xmj and xm 2 X represents the voters ideal policy.
than standard theory of voting. See for example Tomz and Van Houweling (2008).
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The voter cannot observe the policies chosen by the candidates, (xA; xB) ; but only a signal that refers
to the relative location of the policies chosen by the candidates, that is, the voter only knows whether
the policies chosen by the two candidates are the same or they are di¤erent, and in this case, which
policy is more rightist and which one is more leftist. Formally, the signal that the voter receives after the
candidates choose their platforms is denoted by S 2 fL;R; Ig and is dened as follows:
S (xA; xB) =
8>>><>>>:
L if xA < xB
I if xA = xB
R if xA > xB
The voter has beliefs over the candidates chosen policies (xA; xB) that depend on the observed
signal S (xA; xB). The beliefs of the voter are represented by a probability distribution over X2 and
are assumed to be common knowledge by the candidates.
For S (xA; xB) = L let bL denote the density function of the probability distribution over the set
YL =

(xA; xB) 2 X2 : xA < xB
	
bL represents the beliefs of the voter regarding the pairs of policies chosen by the candidates when
she observes signal L. Similarly, for S (xA; xB) = R let bR denote the density function of the probability
distribution over the set
YR =

(xA; xB) 2 X2 : xA > xB
	
bR represents the beliefs of the voter regarding the pairs of policies chosen by the candidates when
she observes signal R. Finally, for S (xA; xB) = I let bI denote the density function of the probability
distribution over the set
YI =

(xA; xB) 2 X2 : xA = xB
	
bI represents the beliefs of the voter regarding the pairs of policies chosen by the candidates when she
observes signal I. See gure 1a and 1b.
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[Insert Figures 1a, 1b and 1c]
It is possible that the beliefs of the voter after receiving a given signal assign positive probability to
only a proper subset of the set of pairs of policies consistent with the observed signal. Figure 1c shows
an example of such a case. For any signal S; let yS(bS) denote the support of bS ; that is, the subset of YS
that contains all pairs of policies to which bS assigns positive probability. The beliefs of the voter over
the candidatesstrategies after observing each signal are common knowledge for all players.
Formally, we have that the voters expected utility from candidate As policy proposal xA when
candidate Bs proposal is xB; after receiving signal S = S (xA; xB) is given by
E

Um (A) : bS(xA;xB)

=
X
(xA;xB)2YS(xA;xB)
um (xA) bS(xA;xB) (xA; xB) ;
The voter decides to vote for candidate A if
E

Um (A) : bS(xA;xB)

> E

Um (B) : bS(xA;xB)

which holds if and only if
X
(xA;xB)2YS(xA;xB)
[um (xA)  um (xB)] bS(xA;xB) (xA; xB) > 0:
Notice that since YI =

(xA; xB) 2 X2 : xA = xB
	
when S = I we have any belief that the voter
might have has to imply that xA = xB; and thus we have that for all bI 2 X2:
E

Um (A) : bI(xA;xB)

= E

Um (B) : bI(xA;xB)

because
X
(xA;xB)2YI
[um (xA)  um (xB)] bI (xA; xB) = 0:
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In particular, we have that if the voters beliefs after each signal are represented by a uniform proba-
bility over a full support then it is easy to see that a voter with xm < 12 will strictly prefer to vote for A
when the signal is L and will strictly prefer to vote for B when the signal is R. Similarly, with uniform
beliefs over a full support a voter with xm > 12 will strictly prefer to vote for B when the signal is L and
will strictly prefer to vote for A when the signal is R.
Instead, if the beliefs are not uniform or they do not have full support then the voters optimal decision
is not so obvious and it depends on the specic functional forms of the voters beliefs.
We assume that candidates do not know the exact location of xm and they have beliefs about it that
are common knowledge and are represented by a probability distribution F : X ! [0; 1] with full support
over X and with density f : X ! [0; 1]: If candidates knew the exact value of xm; they could anticipate
the probability with which the voter votes for each candidate and they could use it to decide their optimal
strategy. Since we assume that candidates have beliefs about the value of xm; they can only anticipate the
expected probability with which the voter votes for each candidate.3 Let pS(xA;xB)
 
F; bS(xA;xB)

denote
the candidatesexpected probability with which the voter votes for candidate A after observing signal
S (xA; xB). Then we have that:
pS(xA;xB)
 
F;bS(xA;xB)

=
nX
i=1
aS(xA;xB)
 
xi; bS(xA;xB)

f(xi)
where the function aS(xA;xB)
 
xm; bS(xA;xB)

denotes the probability with which the voter votes for
candidate A after she observes signal S, when her ideal point is xm; and the beliefs induced by signal S
are bS(xA;xB). Formally, the function aS(xA;xB)
 
xm; bS(xA;xB)

is dened as follows:
aS(xA;xB)
 
xm; bS(xA;xB)

=
8>>><>>>:
1 if E

um (xA) : bS(xA;xB)

> E

um (xB) : bS(xA;xB)

 if E

um (xA) : bS(xA;xB)

= E

um (xB) : bS(xA;xB)

0 if E

um (xA) : bS(xA;xB)

< E

um (xB) : bS(xA;xB)
 :
3Our assumptions o¤er an alternative interpretation: consider innite voters with ideal points distributed on the policy
space according to the function F ; candidates have complete information about the distribution of the votersideal points
and maximize their vote share, instead of their probability of winning.
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where  2 12 ; 1 : Thus, we assume that the voter votes for the party whose platform o¤ers her the
largest utility4, given a xed value of xm: If the beliefs of the voter after observing signal S are such
that the policy proposal of candidate A o¤ers higher utility to the voter, in expected terms, than the
policy proposal of candidate B, then the voter will vote for candidate A after observing signal S, and
thus we will have that aS(xA;xB)
 
xm; bS(xA;xB)

= 1. Similarly, if the beliefs of the voter after observing
signal S are such that the policy proposal of candidate B o¤ers higher utility to the voter, in expected
terms, than the policy proposal of candidate A, then the voter will vote for candidate B after observing
signal S, and thus we will have that aS(xA;xB)
 
xm; bS(xA;xB)

= 0. Finally, if the beliefs of the voter after
observing signal S are such that the policy proposal of candidate A o¤ers equal utility to the voter, in
expected terms, as the policy proposal of candidate B, then after observing signal S the voter will vote
for candidate A with probability  2 12 ; 1 and she will vote for candidate B with probability 1  ; thus
we have that aS(xA;xB)
 
xm; bS(xA;xB)

= .
Notice that the probability  introduces an asymmetry between the two candidates that implies an
advantage for candidate A.5 The e¤ect of this advantage on the voters decision is always minimal since
it only plays a role when the median voter is indi¤erent. Even though the size of the advantage only
a¤ects the probability with which a policy-wise indi¤erent voter chooses candidate A over candidate B, it
has non trivial implications over the policy outcomes: it induces candidates to choose divergent policies
in equilibrium, in particular the advantaged candidate will tend to play more centrist policies and the
disadvantaged candidate will tend to play more extreme policies. The functional form of the votersutility
function assumed in this paper can be thought of as an extension of the one used in the model of electoral
competition in Aragonès and Palfrey (2002). In that case, the indi¤erent voter was assumed to vote for
one of the candidates with probability one and that was the advantaged candidate. Here we assume that
when the voter is indi¤erent she votes for each candidate with a di¤erent probability and di¤erent from
1/2 as well. In our case the advantaged candidate is the one that is chosen by the indi¤erent voter with
the largest probability.
The timing of the game is as follows. First both candidates choose their policy platforms simulta-
neously. We consider both pure and mixed strategies for the candidates. Given the candidates policy
4 If the voter had perfect information she would vote for candidate A whenever (xA; xB) is such that jxA   xmj <
jxB   xmj ; she would vote for candidate B whenever (xA; xB) is such that jxA   xmj > jxB   xmj ; and whenever (xA; xB)
is such that jxA   xmj = jxB   xmj she would vote for candidate A with probability  and for candidate B with probability
1  .
5Under the alternative interpretation in which candidates have complete information about the votersideal points and
maximize their vote share instead of their probability of winning, the advantage can be interpreted as follows: there is a
proportion  of indi¤erent voters that vote for candidate A and a proportion 1  of indi¤erent voters that vote for candidate
B.
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choices, a signal is sent to the voter. This signal will tell the voter that candidate A has chosen a policy
to the left of candidate Bs policy choice (formally, signal L), or it will tell the voter that candidate A
has chosen a policy to the right of candidate Bs policy choice (formally, signal R), or it will tell the voter
that both candidates have chosen the same policy (formally, signal I).
If candidates are using pure strategies, the signal that the voter receives is based on the candidates
choice of policies described by the pure strategies. If candidates are using mixed strategies, the signal
that the voter receives is based on the realization of the candidateschoice of policies described by the
mixed strategies.
The beliefs of the voter over the candidatespolicy choices after receiving each signal are given. The
voter evaluates the utility that she derives from each candidate taking into account the signal received and
the beliefs corresponding to that signal, and she votes for the candidate that o¤ers her a higher expected
utility. Notice that the voters prior beliefs do not have to be updated during the game, because the
voter does not acquire any new information that may a¤ect her beliefs about the candidateschoices after
observing a given signal. Thus the beliefs that the voter uses to interpret each signal, and to evaluate
each candidate, coincide with the beliefs of the voter at the beginning of the game and are common
knowledge to all players. In particular, we have that for all S 2 fL;R; Ig the functions pS (F;bS) are
common knowledge to the candidates when they make their strategy choices.
Let
 
xA; xB
 2 X2 denote a pair of pure strategies for candidates A and B respectively. Let
A
 
xA; xB jbL; bI ; bR

= pS(xA;xB)

F; bS(xA;xB)

and
B
 
xA; xB jbL; bI ; bR

= 1  pS(xA;xB)

F; bS(xA;xB)

denote the payo¤s of candidates A and B respectively when their policy choices are
 
xA; xB

and the
voters beliefs are bL; bI ; bR:
Let
 
A; B

denote a pair of mixed strategies for candidates A and B respectively, where i = 
i1; :::; 
i
n
 2 X denotes the probability with which candidate i chooses each policy. Let
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A
 
A; B jbL; bI ; bR

=
X
S2fL;I;Rg
X
(xA;xB)2YS
pS(xA;xB)

F; bS(xA;xB)

A
 
xA

B
 
xB

and
B
 
A; B jbL; bI ; bR

= 1 A  A; B jbL; bI ; bR 
denote the payo¤s of candidates A and B respectively when their strategies are
 
A; B

and the
voters beliefs are bL; bI ; bR:
The extensive game described above is a game of imperfect information because the voter cannot
observe the strategies chosen by the candidates, and it is also a game of incomplete information because
the candidates cannot observe the type of the voter. Notice, that, in game-theoretical terms, each of the
three signals corresponds to a distinct information set. This is why in the remainder we use the terms
"signal" and "information set" interchangeably.
In order to solve it we use the equilibrium concept of Sequential Equilibrium (SE). Given the functions
S (xA; xB) and as (xm; bS) for all S 2 fL;R; Ig, and given the candidatescommon beliefs on the voters
ideal point, F; a Sequential Equilibrium is described by two6 (possibly) mixed strategies
A =
 
A1 ; :::; An
 2 X and B =  B1 ; :::; Bn  2 X;
and voters beliefs
bS for all S 2 fL;R; Ig
such that
A
 
A; B jbL; bI ; bR
  A  A; B jbL; bI ; bR   A  A; B jbL; bI ; bR 
6This is without loss of generality. Formally, in this setup a SE should include 2 + 3 n strategies: one strategy for each
candidate and one strategy for the voter for each possible ideal policy of the voter in all three information sets. A belief
system, though, uniquely denes the optimal strategy of the voter for each possible ideal policy and each information set.
Hence, including both the beliefs and the strategies of the voter is unnecessary and just makes notation heavier.
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for all A and B given
 
A; B

and (bL; bI ; bR)
and there is a sequence of completely mixed strategies

Aj ; 
B
j
1
j=1
with limj!1

Aj ; 
B
j
1
j=1
= 
A; B

such that (bL; bI ; bR) = limj!1 (bL; bI ; bR)j where (bL; bI ; bR)j denotes the beliefs derived
from strategy prole

Aj ; 
B
j

using Bayesrule (sequential rationality). In case A and B are fully
mixed, it follows that
bL(xi; xi0) =
Ai 
B
i0
n 1P
k=1
[Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj ]
for (xi; xi0) 2 YL;
bI(xi; xi0) =
Ai 
B
i0
nP
k=1
Ak 
B
k
for (xi; xi0) 2 YI
bR(xi; xi0) =
Ai 
B
i0
n 1P
k=1
[Bk
nP
j=k+1
Aj ]
for (xi; xi0) 2 YR:
Notice that each belief system (bL; bI ; bR) induces a normal form constant-sum game between the
two candidates. We refer to it as the reduced game given the belief system (bL; bI ; bR). A reduced
game between the two candidates is considered to be trivial when each candidate is indi¤erent among all
available strategies independently of what his opponent candidate is expected to play.
In order to rule out equilibria with belief systems which induce a trivial reduced game between
the two candidates we employ the very-weak-dominance notion of Marx and Swinkels (1993). That
is, we consider that a strategy A is undominated given (bL; bI ; bR) if there exists no A such that
A
 
A; B jbL; bI ; bR
  A  A; B jbL; bI ; bR  for all B (the equivalent holds for player B). We only
consider those SE in which the strategies of the two candidates are undominated strategies.
We characterize the unique strategies of the candidates in a sequential equilibrium in undominated
strategies for an even number of policies. When the number of policies is odd the analysis is analogous
and we o¤er some details of it in Appendix 2. For the main results we assume that F (xn=2)  12 : The
analysis of the case F (xn=2)  12 is symmetric to this one and it is discussed but nor formalized. We show
that there exists a unique sequential equilibrium in undominated strategies for any  2 [12 ; 1], except for
the very special case that  = F (xn=2) =
1
2 in which all equilibria are in dominated strategies.
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4 Characterization of the Equilibria
There are the three unique possibilities of the candidatesexpected payo¤ in equilibrium. Observe that in
a SE one of the following should hold: a) pL = pR = , b) pL 6= pR and  2 [minfpL; pRg;maxfpL; pRg],
and c)  > maxfpL; pRg or  < minfpL; pRg. Here and for the rest of the paper we write pS to denote
pS (F; bS) for S 2 fL;R; Ig. We will analyze the conditions under which a SE in undominated strategies
exists in each one of these cases and the features of such equilibria. The next proposition sheds some light
on the kind of equilibria that we will encounter.
Proposition 1 a) There is no SE in undominated strategies in which pL = pR = . b) If in a SE in
undominated strategies we have pL 6= pR and  2 [minfpL; pRg;maxfpL; pRg] then candidates converge
to an extreme policy. c) Otherwise, ( > maxfpL; pRg or  < minfpL; pRg) in a SE in undominated
strategies candidates play mixed strategies with full support.
All proofs can be found in Appendix 1.
The above proposition does not guarantee existence of SE in undominated strategies for any parameter
values. It just gives properties of such equilibria if they exist. It is easy to see that if pL = pR =  no
candidate has an undominated strategy, because any equilibrium strategy is very-weakly-dominated by
any other strategy. Next we o¤er complete characterizations of the equilibria that exist for all the other
cases and we show that for any set of parameter values there is an essentially unique SE in undominated
strategies. By essentially unique we mean that the candidatesequilibrium strategies are uniquely dened,
but there might be multiple belief systems that support the same strategy prole.
We start assuming that F (xn=2) >
1
2 , that is, candidatesexpect the ideal point of the median voter
to be rather leftist. The case F (xn=2) <
1
2 is very similar and we only o¤er some comments about it.
Afterwards, we derive the equilibrium results corresponding to F (xn=2) =
1
2 .
First, suppose that the size of the advantage is small relative to the asymmetry in the expected location
of the median voters ideal point, that is, suppose that F (xn=2)  . We nd that the equilibrium is such
that  2 [minfpL; pRg;maxfpL; pRg] and there exists an essentially unique SE in undominated strategies
such that both parties converge to an extreme of the policy space. When F (xn=2) >
1
2 , that is, when the
ideal point of the voter is most likely to be to the left, in a SE we cannot have candidates expecting the
voter to vote with larger probability for a candidate whose proposed policy is the most rightist. Thus, in
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this case both candidates have strong incentives to propose leftist policies, and since the voter will only be
aware of the relative position of the candidateschoices in the policy space, their choices will converge to
the most extreme leftist policy. In this case we have existence of an essentially unique SE in undominated
strategies.
Proposition 2 An essentially unique SE in undominated strategies exists and it is such that the candi-
datesstrategies are
 
xA; xB

= (0; 0) if and only if F (xn=2)  :
Observe that in this equilibrium we will have that pL =   F (xn=2) and pR = 1     1   F (xn=2):
That is, since in equilibrium both candidates choose the same policy location, their winning probability is
given by the asymmetric tie breaking rule used by the voter. When the size of the advantage is relatively
small, the disadvantaged candidate does not have strong incentives to di¤erentiate, and it allows for the
possibility of a convergent equilibrium. This equilibrium collapses for larger values of ; because the
probability with which candidate B wins, if he chooses the same policy platform as that of candidate A,
becomes much smaller. In particular when  > F (xn=2); candidate B prefers to di¤erentiate and obtain
pR = 1   F (xn=2) > 1    rather than o¤er the same policy with A and get 1    probability of being
elected.
Notice that if we assume that F (xn=2) <
1
2 ; then it would not be possible to have pR    pL in
equilibrium, that is, if the ideal point of the voter is most likely to be to the right, in equilibrium we
cannot have candidates expecting the voter to vote with larger probability for a candidate whose proposed
policy is more leftist. In this case, we would have that the essentially unique SE in undominated strategies
should satisfy pL    pR and to be such that both candidates converge to the right extreme of the
policy space.
Now we consider the case in which the size of the advantage is large relative to the asymmetry in
the expected location of the median voters ideal point, that is, suppose that F (xn=2) < . The next
proposition shows that for these high values of  there exists a unique SE in undominated strategies.
In this case, the asymmetry between the candidates, dened by the size of the advantage, has a larger
e¤ect on the equilibrium strategies, and induces the candidates to use mixed strategies: the disadvantaged
candidate is better o¤ mixing, otherwise the advantage candidate would imitate his policy choices and
drive his probability of winning down to 1  . We nd that in this equilibrium both candidates will use
mixed strategies with full support.
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Proposition 3 A unique SE in undominated strategies exists and it is such that the candidatesstrategies
are Ak = (H
)k 1 1 H

1 (H)n and 
B
k = (H
)n k 1 H

1 (H)n for k = 1; :::; n with H
 =   F (xn=2)  1+F (xn=2) < 1
and bL(xi; xi0) =
(H)n+i i
0 1(1 H)2
1 n(H)n 1 , bI(xi; xi0) =
(H)i i
0
n , bR(xi; xi0) =
(H)i i
0 1(1 H)2
n 1 H+(H)n if and only if
F (xn=2) < .
Observe that in this equilibrium we have that pL = F (xn=2) <  and pR = 1  F (xn=2) > 1  ; that
is, the advantaged candidate expects to win with larger probability than the disadvantaged candidate,
but in this case the probabilities of winning are not determined by the size of the advantage, instead
they are mainly determined by the expected location of the median voters ideal point. We have that
@Ak
@k =
(H)k 1(1 H)
1 (H)n lnH
 < 0 and @
B
k
@k =   (H
)n k(1 H)
1 (H)n lnH
 > 0 since H < 1, thus Ak decreases
with k and Bk increases with k. Figures 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d present examples of such mixed equilibria.
[Insert Figures 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d about here]
Notice that the equilibrium strategies put increasing amounts of probability on policies that are at
the extremes of the policy space and candidates di¤erentiate: each candidates strategy assigns most of
the probability to a di¤erent extreme of the policy space. The candidates equilibrium strategies are
symmetric to each other. The advantaged candidates equilibrium strategy assigns most of its probability
to policies that are on the left side of the policy space, while the disadvantaged candidates equilibrium
strategy assigns most of its probability to policies that are on the right side of the policy space. The reason
is that both candidates believe that it is more likely that the ideal point of the median voter is on the
left side of the policy space (F (xn=2) >
1
2). This leads the advantaged candidate to assign large amounts
of probability to policies that are close to zero, and thus, in order to di¤erentiate, the disadvantaged
candidate has to assign most of his probability to policies that are close to one.
We nd that in equilibrium the voter votes for A as follows: with probability one if xm < 12 and
we are in information set L, with probability one if xm > 12 and we are in information set R; and with
probability  if we are in information set I. Otherwise, the voter votes for B.
If instead we had assumed that F (xn=2) <
1
2 ; we would have that pL = F (xn=2) <
1
2 and pR =
1 F (xn=2) > 12 . Now candidates would expect to win with larger probability if they chose policies on the
right side of the policy space since they believe that the median voter is most likely to be rightist. In this
case, by symmetry, we would have that the unique SE in undominated strategies should be symmetric to
18
the one described for F (xn=2) >
1
2 : the advantaged candidate assigns increasing amounts of probability
to policies that are close to one, and according to a mirror image, the disadvantaged candidate assigns
increasing amounts of probability to policies that are close to zero.
Remark 1 When   1 min ff (x1) ; f (xn)g there may exist SE in dominated strategies. For instance,
suppose that n = 10;  = 0:6; F (3=9) = 0:4; F (4=9) = 0:55; F (6=9) = 0:6.7 Notice that in this case we have
 = 0:6 > F (xn=2) = 0:55 >
1
2 and min ff (x1) ; f (xn)g  0:4; thus,  = 0:6  1  min ff (x1) ; f (xn)g :
So, if candidate A chooses policy 5=9 with probability one and candidate B chooses policies 2=9 and 8=9
each with probability 12 , and the voters beliefs are bL(5=9; 8=9) = 1, bI(5=9; 5=9) = 1, bR(5=9; 2=9) = 1 we
have a SE in dominated strategies.8
Remark 2 When  > 1 min ff (x1) ; f (xn)g there are no SE in dominated strategies. That is, the game
admits a unique SE (the one described in proposition 3). F having full support means that f(x1) > 0 and
f(xn) > 0. That is, when we are in information set L, the voter expects higher utility from A if xm = x1
and higher utility from B if xm = xn for any bL; therefore pL 2 [f(x1); 1   f(xn)]. Equivalently, when
we are in information set R, the voter expects higher utility from A if xm = xn and higher utility from B
if xm = x1 for any bR; therefore pR 2 [f(xn); 1  f(x1)]. So if  > 1 min ff (x1) ; f (xn)g then for any
possible bL and bR we have that  > maxfpL; pRg (and this should obviously hold in a SE too). And as
we know from propositions 1 and 3 there exists a unique SE such that  > maxfpL; pRg and it is the one
described in proposition 3.9
7Remember that for n = 10 we have that xk = k 19 :
8To see why this is a SE consider the following fully mixed strategies:
A6 = 1  ( 1 ); Ak = 19 ( 1 ) for k 6= 6
and
B3 = 
B
9 =
1
2
  1

; Bk =
1
8
2

for k =2 f3; 9g
for some  > 2.
We observe that for ! +1 we have that A6 ! 1, B3 = B9 ! 12 and
A6 
B
6Pn
i=1 
A
i 
B
i
! 1:
Hence these strategies converge to the described strategy prole and they are fully mixed. If the voter has beliefs consistent
with candidates playing these strategies it should be the case that bL(x6; x9) = bR(x6; x3)! 1 and bI(x6; x6)! 1.
9The arguments presented in Remark 2 also prove that when  > 1   min ff (x1) ; f (xn)g, the unique SE of the game
is also the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game. That is, for large values of the advantage the equilibrium
prediction of (nearly) maximum di¤erentiation is very robust.
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Finally, we deal with the case F (xn=2) =
1
2 : First notice that if  = F (xn=2) =
1
2 then there is no
SE in undominated strategies. This is expected for the simple reason that in this corner case the game
satises two notions of symmetry at the same time: both parties are completely identical ( = 12) and the
probability with which the voter is leftist is identical to the probability with which the voter is rightist
(F (xn=2) =
1
2). Hence, in any SE we have that pL =
1
2 = pR and, thus, each equilibrium strategy is very-
weakly dominated by any other strategy. However, when we break at least one of these symmetries we
have existence and uniqueness of a SE in undominated strategies. The case with asymmetric distribution
of the median voters ideal point and identical candidates has already been included in the previous
analysis. Here we focus on the case with symmetric distribution of the median voters ideal point and an
advantaged candidate, that is,  > F (xn=2) =
1
2 . We show that in this case we also have existence and
uniqueness of SE in undominated strategies.
Proposition 4 A unique SE in undominated strategies exists and it is such that the candidatesstrategies
are Ak = 
B
k =
1
n for k = 1; :::; n; and bL = bR =
2
n(n 1) , bI =
1
n if and only if  > F (xn=2) =
1
2 .
When we have that the ideal point of the median voter is equally likely to be rightist or leftist,
candidates do not have a special interest in occupying the extremes of the policy space. But the presence
of the advantage in a rather symmetric environment induces the disadvantaged candidate to mix in order
to improve his chances of winning. In fact, as the bias of the median voter expected location decreases
(F (xn=2) approaches
1
2) the slope of the equilibrium probabilities for both candidates decreases: they
assign less probability to extreme policies and assign increasing amounts of probability to more centrist
policies. Hence, F (xn=2) =
1
2 is a limiting case and it is such that the equilibrium strategies for both
candidates become uniform distributions over all the policy space.
Combining the results of the previous propositions for F (xn=2) >
1
2 we have a unique SE in undomi-
nated strategies for all  2 12 ; 1 : If   F (xn=2) by proposition 2 we know that in any SE in undominated
strategies, the strategies of both candidates concentrate all of their probability in the left extreme of the
policy space. If  > F (xn=2) by proposition 3 we know that in the unique SE in undominated strate-
gies, the strategies of the candidates concentrate most of their probability in di¤erent extremes of the
policy space. Hence for any pair of  2 [12 ; 1] and F (xn=2) > 12 there exists an essentially unique SE in
undominated strategies.
Similarly we could show that for F (xn=2) <
1
2 we have an essentially unique SE in undominated
strategies for all  2 12 ; 1 : If  < 1 F (xn=2) in any SE in undominated strategies, the strategies of both
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candidates concentrate all of their probability in the right extreme of the policy space. If  > 1 F (xn=2)
in the unique SE in undominated strategies, the strategies of the candidates concentrate most of their
probability in di¤erent extremes of the policy space. Hence for any pair of  2 [12 ; 1] and F (xn=2) < 12
there exists an essentially unique SE in undominated strategies. And we have shown also existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium for  > F (xn=2) =
1
2 . Thus we can state the following result:
Corollary 1 A unique SE in undominated strategies exists for any  2 [12 ; 1] and any F (xn=2) 2 [12 ; 1]
except for (; F (xn=2)) = (
1
2 ;
1
2).
5 Properties of the Equilibria
We have shown that a SE in undominated strategies exists for almost all parameter values (except for
F (xn=2) =  =
1
2) and that in all cases the equilibrium strategies are uniquely dened. Furthermore, we
have shown that whenever F (xn=2) 6= 12 the candidatesequilibrium strategies tend to the extremes of the
policy space. It is only when F (xn=2) =
1
2 that the mixed strategies used in equilibrium are uniform over
the policy space. In this section we analyze the equilibrium strategies, payo¤s and beliefs for all possible
parameter values. In addition we show that our equilibrium results are robust to increases of the voters
information about the candidatesplatforms.
5.1 Strategies
In the pure strategy equilibrium we found that the candidatesstrategies converge to policy x1 = 0 when
1
2    F (xn=2), and converge to policy xn = 1 when 1  F (xn=2)    12 . In this case the equilibrium
payo¤s of candidate A are given by its probability of winning which is  > 12 , since in equilibrium both
candidates choose the same policy. Notice that this equilibrium relies on the asymmetry of the expectation
of the candidates about the voters ideal point. The further F (xn=2) is from
1
2 the larger the set of values
of  for which this equilibrium exists, and when F (xn=2) approaches
1
2 this equilibrium ceases to exist.
The comparative statics are more complex for the mixed strategy equilibrium.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, candidate A assigns increasing probability to policies that are close
to x1 = 0 and candidate B uses a mirror image strategy, that is, he assigns increasing probability to
policies that are close to xn = 1. The extremism of this equilibrium policies is large for larger values
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of F (xn=2); that is, for more asymmetric expectations of the candidates about the voters ideal point,
candidate A assigns more probability to policies that are close to x1 = 0 and decreases the probability
that he assigns to policies larger than 12 . Observe that
@Ak
@H =
Hk 2[k(1 H) 1+Hn(1+(n k)(1 H))]
(1 Hn)2
and since H < 1 we have that @
A
k
@H < 0 holds only for small values of k, because as k increases
k (1 H)   1 becomes positive and @Ak@H turns positive for large values of k. On the other hand, since
H =   F (xn=2)  1+F (xn=2) we have that
@H
@F (xn=2)
= 1 2
(  1+F (xn=2))2
< 0. Thus we have that
@Ak
@F (xn=2)
=
@Ak
@H
@H
@F (xn=2)
> 0
for small k and the opposite holds when k is large enough.
Also observe that for larger values of n the proportion of policies with increasing probability is smaller.
This means that for larger values of F (xn=2) the probability with which candidate A chooses rightist
policies decreases while the probability with which he chooses leftist policies increases. For candidate B
we have a symmetric e¤ect: when F (xn=2) increases, he assigns less probability to policies that are close
to x1 = 0 and increases the probability he assigns to policies that are close to xn = 1. Because we have
that
@Bk
@H =
(H)n k 1[n k (n k+1)H]+(H)2n k 1[k (k 1)H]
(1 (H)n)2
and since H < 1 we have that @
B
k
@H > 0 holds only for small values of k, because as k increases
[n  k   (n  k + 1)H] becomes negative and @Bk@H turns negative for large values of k. Thus we have
that
@Bk
@F (xn=2)
=
@Ak
@H
@H
@F (xn=2)
< 0
for small k and the opposite holds when k is large enough.
The candidates equilibrium strategies also change with the size of the advantage of candidate A.
In this case we have that when the value of  increases, candidate A decreases the probability that he
22
assigns to policies that are close to x1 = 0 and increases the probability assigned to policies that are
larger than 12 , because using the argument described above to compute the sign of
@Ak
@H and given that
@H
@ =
2F (xn=2) 1
(  1+F (xn=2))2
> 0; we have that @
A
k
@ =
@Ak
@H
@H
@ < 0 for small k and the opposite holds when k
is large enough.
Similarly, for candidate B we have that when  increases, he assigns more probability to policies that
are close to x1 = 0 and decreases the probability he assigns to policies that are close to xn = 1, because
in this case we have that @
A
k
@ =
@Ak
@H
@H
@ > 0 for small k and the opposite holds when k is large enough.
When the number of policies in the policy space increases we have that the probability assigned
to each policy decreases (@
A
k
@n =
Hn+k 1(1 H)
(1 Hn)2 lnH
 < 0 and @
B
k
@n =
Hn k(1 H)
(1 Hn)2 lnH
 < 0). More
interestingly, when the number of policies goes to innity we nd that in the limit the equilibrium
strategies show maximal extremism and maximal di¤erentiation for any  2 [12 ; 1]. Let bxc denote the
smallest integer of x 2 <:
Proposition 5 For any a 2 (0; 1); limn!1
bancP
k=1
Ak (n) = 1 and limn!1
nP
k=b(1 a)nc
Bk (n) = 1:
In plain words, when we look at the limiting case where the discrete grid on the policy space becomes
arbitrarily ne and the advantage becomes arbitrarily small, we nd that the distributions of the strategies
of both candidates approach two degenerate distributions with all mass in each one of the extreme of
the policy space: the advantaged candidate on the extreme most likely preferred by the voter and the
disadvantaged candidate on the opposite extreme. Thus in the limit both candidates strategies show
maximal di¤erentiation concentrating their probability on each one of the most extreme policies.
5.2 Payo¤s
Since we assume that in case of indi¤erence the voter votes for candidate A with probability   12 , we
expect that the advantage of candidate A will show in the equilibrium results. Notice that the equilibrium
payo¤s for candidate A can be written as:
A
 
A; B jbL; bI ; bR

= A
 
x1; 
B jbL; bI ; bR

= B1 +
 
1  B1

F (xn=2)
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because in the mixed strategy equilibrium candidate A must be indi¤erent among all pure strategies in
his support, and in particular, the payo¤ he obtains when he plays x1 is as shown above: with probability
B1 both candidates choose the same strategy and candidate A wins with probability  and, otherwise,
candidate B chooses a strategy to the right of candidate A, thus the voter gets signal L and she is expected
to vote for candidate A with probability pL = F (xn=2). Therefore, candidate As payo¤s in equilibrium
are larger than candidate Bs, because we have that both  and F (xn=2) are larger than
1
2 : In fact since
 > F (xn=2)  12 we have that  > A
 
A; B jbL; bI ; bR

> F (xn=2)  12 . Moreover, they are increasing
in  because As payo¤s can also be written as
A
 
A; B jbL; bI ; bR

= A
 
xn; 
B jbL; bI ; bR

= Bn +
 
1  Bn

(1  F (xn=2))
and hence
@A(xn;B jbL;bI ;bR )
@ = 
B
n +
 
  (1  F (xn=2))
 @Bn
@H
@H
@ > 0
since @H

@ > 0 and
@Bn
@H =
Hn 2(n(1 H) 1+Hn)
(1 Hn)2 > 0 for every H
 < 1. In gures 3a and 3b we
present examples of how candidate As equilibrium payo¤s relate to the value of the advantage.
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here]
Observe that the payo¤s of candidate A are always increasing with the size of the advantage. When
the advantage size is smaller than the bias of the distribution, the payo¤s of candidate A are increasing
proportionally to the size of the advantage. However, when the advantage size is larger than the bias of
the distribution, the payo¤s of candidate A are only weakly increasing, and they become atter for larger
values of n:
Furthermore we have that the equilibrium payo¤s of candidate A decrease with n; because as the
number of policies increases the e¤ect of the advantage vanishes. This is so because
A
 
A; B jbL; bI ; bR

= F (xn=2) +
 
  F (xn=2)
 Hn 1(1 H)
1 Hn
implies that
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@A(A;B)
@n =
 
  F (xn=2)
 Hn 1(1 H) lnH
(1 Hn)2 < 0.
We also have that as the number of equidistant policies goes to innity the payo¤ of candidate A in
equilibrium converges to the probability with which the ideal point of the voter is expected to be on the
left side of the policy space.
limn!1A
 
A; B jbL; bI ; bR

= F (xn=2).
Finally, observe that as pointed above, the equilibrium payo¤s of candidate A are increasing with
F (xn=2) in all cases:
@A(A;B jbL;bI ;bR )
@F (xn=2)
=
@A(A;B jbL;bI ;bR )
@H
@H
@F (xn=2)
and since
@A(A;B jbL;bI ;bR )
@H =
 
  F (xn=2)
 Hn 2(n(1 H) 1)(1 Hn)+nH2(n 1)(1 H)
(1 Hn)2 < 0
it trivially follows that
@A(A;B jbL;bI ;bR )
@F (xn=2)
> 0.
Since this is a zero sum game, the comparative statics for the payo¤s of candidate B can be derived
from the previous results.
5.3 Beliefs
The voters beliefs in equilibrium after observing any given signal S are given by:
bL(xi; xi0) =
(H)n i
0+i(1 H)2
H+(H)n[(n 1)H n] for (xi; xi0) 2 YL;
bI(xi; xi0) =
1
n for (xi; xi0) 2 YI ;
bR(xi; xi0) =
(H) i
0+i 1(1 H)2
(H)n 1+n(1 H) for (xi; xi0) 2 YR;
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Notice that for every S 2 fL;Rg we have
@bS(xi;xi0 )
@i = bS(xi; xi0) lnH
 < 0
and
@bS(xi;xi0 )
@i0 =  bS(xi; xi0) lnH > 0:
This implies that when the voter observes any signal she rightly assigns larger probability to candidate
A choosing policies that are closer to x1 = 0 and larger probability to candidate B choosing policies that
are closer to xn = 1.
Now dene  = ji  i0j (the distance between the policy platforms of the two candidates). We see that
@bL(xi;xi0 )
@ =  bL(xi; xi0) lnH > 0
which suggests that after signal L the voter assigns higher probability to more distant pairs of policy
platforms (notice that bL(xi; xi0) is maximized at (0; 1))
and that
@bR(xi;xi0 )
@ = bR(xi; xi0) lnH
 < 0
which suggests that after signal R the voter assigns higher probability to more neighboring pairs of
policy platforms (notice that bR(xi; xi0) is maximized at (xi; xi 1) for every i 2 f2; ; 3; :::; ng).
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b about here]
Examples of distributions of the voters beliefs after signals L and R are illustrated in gures 4a and
4b. Observe that after signal L the voter assigns larger probability to pairs of distant platforms, that
is, she rightly expects that when candidate A is the most leftist, he is expected to choose extreme leftist
policies and candidate B is expected to choose extreme rightist policies. While after signal R the voter
assigns larger probability to pairs of similar platforms, that is, she rightly expects that when candidate
A is the most rightist, both candidates must be choosing neighboring policies.
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5.4 Informed Voters
We now consider a generalized model in which the voter actually "sees" the policies that the candidates
o¤er with probability " 2 [0; 1]. Otherwise, with probability 1   ", as in the main model, the voter can
only observe whether both candidates have chosen the same policy, or when that is not the case, which
candidate has chosen a more rightist or leftist policy.
We will argue that for su¢ ciently small values of " this generalized model admits an undominated
SE such that the behavior of all players is very similar to the case that we analyzed in the previous
sections. That is, we prove that the equilibrium predictions of extremist candidate behavior are robust
to the introduction of a small enough probability that the voter is actually informed. Notice that a small
probability of our voter being informed corresponds to a tiny fraction of informed voters if we use the
interpretation of many voters.
We denote by (") the pair of candidates strategies in an undominated SE of this generalized
game. Let (0) denote the equilibrium pair of strategies of the extended game corresponding to " = 0
(the equilibrium pair of strategies of the main model). That is, (0) denotes the pure strategy prole
(x1; x1) = (0; 0) when   F (xn=2) and it denotes the mixed strategy prole of proposition 3 when
 > F (xn=2).
Proposition 6 For  6= F (xn=2) > 12 and " su¢ ciently small there exists an undominated SE such that
lim"!0+ (") = (0):
We do not characterize all the SE of the extended game; we only show existence of a sequence of
equilibria that approaches the equilibria we found for our main model. Given the characteristics of the
sequence, it is normal to conjecture that as " increases, the level of extremism exhibited by candidates in
equilibrium should decrease10. We provide a full characterization of the unique SE for any " 2 [0; 1] for
the particular case in which  = 1, F is uniform and n = 3. We also show that the degree of extremism,
dened as the probability that no candidate o¤ers the moderate platform, in this equilibrium is decreasing
in ":
Proposition 7 If  = 1; F is uniform and X = f0; 12 ; 1g then for any " 2 [0; 1] the unique SE of the
game is such that A1 (") = A3 (") =
1
3+2" ; 
A
2 (") =
1+2"
3+2" and 
B
1 (") = 
B
3 (") =
1+"
3+2" ; 
B
2 (") =
1
3+2" .
10For the special cases in which either  = F (xn=2) or F (xn=2) = 12 the argument used in the proof does not apply. However
we conjecture that continuity would lead to similar results.
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Let
 
A; B

denote the degree of extremism of strategies
 
A; B

. Observe that in this equilibrium
we have that the degree of extremism of the equilibrium strategies is given by

 
A("); B(")

= (1  A2 )(1  B2 ) = 4(1+")(3+2")2 .
The degree of extremism of the equilibrium is a function of the proportion of voters that are informed,
and since
@(A(");B("))
@" =  4(1+2")(3+2")3 < 0 it is strictly decreasing in ".
Furthermore, we have that the equilibrium payo¤s of candidate A are given by
A
 
A("); B(")

= 1  (
A
2 (")+
A
3 ("))
3 = 1  2(1+")3(3+2")
It is straightforward to see that the payo¤s of the advantaged candidate in equilibrium decrease with
the proportion of informed voters (
@A(A(");B("))
@" =   23(3+2")2 < 0). Thus, favoring the introduction
of votersinformation reduces the e¤ect of the advantage and benets the disadvantaged candidate.
By specically assuming that um (x) =  jx   xmj we can compute the expected social welfare,
W (A; B); under a veil of ignorance. That is, if we assume that xm is a random draw from a uni-
form distribution then, in equilibrium, the voters expected welfare should be given by
W (A("); B(")) = 213 [
A
2 (")(1  B1 ("))( 12) + A3 (")B2 (")( 12) + A3 (")B3 (")( 1)]+
+13 ["(
A
1 (") + 
A
3 ("))(
B
1 (") + 
B
3 ("))( 12) + (1  ")(A1 (") + A3 ("))( 12)] =
=   2(2+")2
3(3+2")2
It is easy to check that expected social welfare increases with the proportion of informed voters
(@W (
A(");B("))
@" =
4(2+")
3(3+2")3
> 0). Hence, as it should be expected, politically informed societies enjoy
higher levels of welfare than societies with a small proportion of informed voters.
For any symmetric F the qualitative implications of the above proposition remain intact. That is, a)
there exists a unique SE, b) the degree of extremism of this unique equilibrium is strictly decreasing in the
probability that the voter is informed and c) expected social welfare is increasing in the probability that
the voter is informed. Notice that, when the voter is uninformed with probability one, both candidates
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mix uniformly (this is in line with the general results of the previous section) and when the voter is
informed with probability one, the mixed strategies of both candidates coincide with the Aragonès and
Palfrey (2002) equilibrium.
6 Comparison with the conventional model
In this section, we compare our set of assumptions regarding votersbehavior with voterspreferences
in conventional models of electoral competition with an advantaged candidate. The comparison of our
model with a generalization of the conventional one will allow us to o¤er a new interpretation of the model
developed here and to provide a rationalization for the assumptions made on the behavior of the voters.
To this end we prove that under both sets of assumptions regarding votersbehavior one gets exactly the
same results in the imperfect information scenario that is developed in this paper.
In the literature which analyzes electoral competition with an advantaged candidate, a discrete policy
space and perfect information regarding candidates choices (see for example Aragonès and Palfrey 2002)
it is assumed that the voters utility is given by um (xA) =  (jxA   xmj) + d if candidate A is elected
and by um (xB) =  (jxB   xmj) if candidate B is elected, where d > 0 is su¢ ciently small (so that it
plays a role only when the voter is indi¤erent between the policy locations of the two candidates, that is,
when  (jxA   xmj) =  (jxB   xmj)). Hence, when the voter is indi¤erent she always votes for the same
candidate, the advantaged candidate, instead of randomizing between the two.
We could generalize the conventional model in the following way: the voters utility is given by
um (xA) =  (jxA   xmj) + d^ if candidate A is elected and by um (xB) =  (jxB   xmj) if candidate B is
elected, where d^ 2 f d; dg for some d > 0. The two candidates have common but imperfect information
regarding the value of d^. They believe that d^ = d with probability  2 12 ; 1 and that d^ =  d with
probability 1  2 0; 12.11 As before when d > 0 is su¢ ciently small and a voter has perfect information
regarding candidates choices, the advantage plays a role only when the voter is indi¤erent between the
policy locations of the two candidates, that is, when  (jxA   xmj) =  (jxB   xmj). In this more general
setup when the voter is indi¤erent between the policy locations of the two candidates she is expected to
vote for A with probability  2 12 ; 1 and for B with probability 1  .
It is obvious that the voterspreferences of this generalized conventional model resemble very much
11We can alternatively assume that d^ is continuously distributed in [d; d] according to an arbitrary distribution function
G: In this case  = 1 G(0).
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(but are not identical to) the assumptions that our model made on the voters behavior. The main
di¤erence lies in the fact that when both candidates o¤er the same policy then a voter is never indi¤erent
between them; when d^ = d (this occurs with probability  2 [12 ; 1]) the voter is strictly better o¤ by voting
for candidate A and when d^ =  d (this occurs with probability 1   2 [0; 12 ]) the voter is strictly better
o¤ by voting for B. That is, this generalization of the conventional model o¤ers a solid rational basis
for our working assumption regarding the votersbehavior when they are indi¤erent between the policies
that the two candidates propose.
By introducing our informational assumptions (voters do not observe the candidatespolicy choices
but only which candidate o¤ers the most conservative/liberal policy) in this generalized version of the
conventional model, we can actually show that for d > 0 su¢ ciently small we obtain the same equilibria
with the model that we extensively analyzed in this paper. In the next proposition we prove this for the
particular case of  = 1. A generalization to any  2 [12 ; 1] trivially follows from the arguments developed
in the proof.
Proposition 8 When  = 1; for any n and F there exists d^(n; F ) > 0 such that for every d 2 (0; d^(n; F )]
the unique SE of a game with the voters preferences of the conventional game and the imperfect infor-
mation scenario of our model coincides with the unique SE of our model.
7 Extensions and concluding remarks
The previous analysis shows that when we combine a small valence advantage for one of the candidates
with imperfect information of the voters about the candidatesplatforms we can nd a unique equilibrium
prediction that depending on the size of the advantage will be in pure or mixed strategies. On the one
hand, the advantage induces the candidates to di¤erentiate from each other, and on the other hand, the
lack of information of the voters induces the candidates to choose extreme policies. When the advantage
is small the candidatesequilibrium choices are mostly driven to the extremes of the policy space, and
when the advantage is large the candidates become more moderate. Similarly, we have also shown that
when the voters become better informed the candidatespolicy choices become less extreme and when
the proportion of well informed voters goes to one, the equilibrium policy choices converge to the ones
described in Aragonès and Palfrey (2002): the advantaged candidate concentrates most of his probability
on moderate policies while the disadvantaged candidate concentrates most of his probability on more
extreme policies.
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All these results are proven on a discrete policy space and they hold for any number of equidistant
policies. In such a game of imperfect information, a discrete policy space has clear technical advantages
when compared to a continuous policy space which we hope that have been made apparent by now. For
instance, the construction of sequences of fully mixed strategies which converge to the equilibrium mixed
strategies and, hence, the characterization of a sequential equilibrium is distinctly more tractable in nite
games than in innite ones. Moreover, the idea that voters perceive two platforms of being the same
not only when they are identical, in the mathematical sense, but also when they are almost identical
is easily modeled by the size of the number of distinct policies that are available in the policy space: a
large n is equivalent to a voter easily distinguishing which policy is more rightist/leftist and a small value
of n captures the case in which a voter can distinguish di¤erences between two policy proposals only if
these policies are very far from each other. If we had a continuous policy space instead then, to account
for the above idea of not noticeable di¤erences between candidatesplatforms, we should develop a more
complicated model in which information set I is produced not only when both candidates o¤er exactly
the same policy but also when their distance is smaller than a xed threshold value. Despite that, we
have su¢ cient formal evidence12 which indicates that if we considered instead a continuous policy space
we would get similar equilibria with the ones that we nd in this nite game (independently of whether
the information set I accounts for the idea of not noticeable di¤erences or not) at the cost of a more
complicated and impractical analysis (in terms of fully describing equilibrium features and properties).
One can further show that when voters are not only informed about the direction of candidates
platforms (as in our model) but also about their distance, then an equilibrium exists in which candidates
use the same strategies as in the unique equilibrium of our game for large values of . This implies that
when one of the candidates enjoys a clear advantage over the other candidate and the number of policy
locations is very large, in equilibrium the mixed strategies of the candidates converge to the pure strategy
prole where each candidate locates at a di¤erent extreme of the policy space and the information of
the voter regarding the location of the platform of each candidate is nearly perfect. This is because in
this variation of our model the voter gets a signal of the following type "candidate A is more leftist than
12For example, when the advantage is small relative to the bias of the distribution it is easy to see that all the arguments
which support the existence of the described sequential equilibrium (in which both candidates converge to the extreme
preferred by the median) directly extend to a model with a continuous policy space (independently of whether I accounts for
not noticeable di¤erences or not). When the advantage is large relative to the bias of the distribution the arguments of our
proofs do not directly extend to a continuous case but we can still nd equilibria that are similar to the unique sequential
equilibrium of our nite game. Imagine that I is produced if and only if both candidates announce the same policy platform.
Then one can show existence of a sequential equilibrium in which A announces the extreme policy preferred by the median
and Bs policy proposal is a random draw from an atomless distribution which includes in its support only policies which
are arbitrarily close to the opposite extreme: an equilibrium of (almost) maximal di¤erentiation like the one of our model
for an arbitrarily large number of locations.
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candidate B and the distance between their platforms is z". As we know, when candidates employ the
identied mixed strategies and when the policy space is rich, the distance z is with a very large probability
very close to one. Hence, the voter will "know" that A chose a policy that is at most 1  z away from the
left extreme and that candidate B chose a platform that is at most 1   z away from the right extreme.
That is, extremism and maximum di¤erentiation may arise even in informational setups much richer than
the one analyzed in this paper.
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8 Appendix 1 (Proofs)
Proof of Proposition 1. a) Since  = pI , each candidate obtains exactly the same probability of
winning, that is, the same payo¤, independently of which is the selected pair of strategies. Thus, any
strategy is dominated.
b) Consider that in a SE we have pR    pL (such that at least one of the two inequalities is strict).
Then, we have that 0 is the unique weakly dominant strategy for both candidates. For candidate A, for
example, any other strategy makes more likely arriving at information set R while not enhancing the
probability of arriving at information set L. By a similar argument we have that 1 is the unique weakly
dominant strategy for both players when pL    pR. Hence in any SE in undominated strategies
in which we have  2 [minfpL; pRg;maxfpL; pRg], both candidates have to converge to one of the two
extremes.
c) Consider that in a SE we have a belief system (bL; bI ; bR) and assume that there exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium
 
A; B

in the reduced game given (bL; bI ; bR) with full support and no gaps
(Ak ; 
B
k > 0 for all k). In the proof we will write pS to denote pS (F; bS) for S 2 fL;R; Ig :
Candidate A knows that if B is playing the mixed strategy that we assume to exist the following will
be true: if candidate A selects location xi then with probability
i 1P
k=1
Bk we arrive in information set R
and he will get a payo¤ equal to pR; with probability Bi we arrive in information set I and he will get a
payo¤ equal to ; and with probability
nP
k=i+1
Bk we arrive in information set L and he will get a payo¤
equal to pL: Thus his expected payo¤ of selecting xi is:
A
 
xi; 
B = pL nP
k=i+1
Bk + 
B
i + pR
i 1P
k=1
Bk
and, similarly his expected payo¤ of selecting xi+1 is:
A
 
xi+1; 
B = pL nP
k=i+2
Bk + 
B
i+1+ pR
iP
k=1
Bk :
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If
 
A; B

is an equilibrium with full support then we must have thatA
 
xi; 
B = A  xi+1; B.
And this equality implies that:
Bi+1
Bi
=   pR  pL , Bi+1 = Bi
  pR
  pL for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; n  1g:
Let H =   pL  pR : Then,
nP
k=1
Bk = 1 implies 
B
1 + 
B
1
1
H + :::+ 
B
1
 
1
H
n 1
= 1 or B1 =
1
n 1P
k=0
( 1H )
k
and
Bi = 
B
1
 
1
H
i 1
for i = 2; :::; n:
Notice that for this equilibrium to exist it is necessary that H > 0; and this implies that in equilibrium
we need to have that either  > pL; pR or  < pL; pR: If H = 1 it trivially follows that Bi =
1
n for all
i 2 f1; :::; ng. Otherwise, if H 6= 1 then Bi = Hn i 1 H1 Hn for i = 1; :::; n:
Using exactly the same steps we can show that Ai =
1
n for all i 2 f1; :::; ng if H = 1. Otherwise, if
H 6= 1 then Ai = H
i 1(1 H)
1 Hn for i = 1; :::; n:
This shows that there exists a unique full support equilibrium in the reduced game if and only if
H > 0.
Since this reduced game is a constant-sum game, it follows that the set of minimax strategies for both
players is convex. If, for example another minimax strategy for player A exists (which should, obviously,
be without full support) then any convex combination of the identied minimax strategy and the assumed
one should be a minimax strategy as well. But since any convex combination of these two strategies has
full support and is di¤erent than the identied minimax strategy then innitely many minimax strategies
with full support should exist which contradicts the above nding. Therefore, when this equilibrium exists
(H > 0) it is unique. Since each player has a unique minimax strategy, it is obviously not dominated,
because it could only be dominated by another minimax strategy.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Proposition 1 we have that in a SE in undominated strategies we may
have either pL 6= pR and  2 [minfpL; pRg;maxfpL; pRg] or  > maxfpL; pRg or  < minfpL; pRg. Let us
rst argue that for F (xn=2)   we cannot have a SE in which  > maxfpL; pRg or  < minfpL; pRg.
Assume that such a SE does exist. Then, as we saw in Proposition 1, and given that F (xn=2) >
1
2 it
should be such that Ai =
Hi 1(1 H)
1 Hn and 
B
i = H
n i 1 H
1 Hn for i = 1; :::; n and H =
  pL
  pR > 0:
If the voter expects that candidates choose the described strategies, it is obvious, that when we arrive
in I; that is for xA = xB; we have that Eum(AjI) = Eum(BjI) and therefore the voter votes for A
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with probability  and she votes for B with probability 1  :
If we are in L then we have that:
Eum(
AjL) =
n 1P
k=1
um(xk)
Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj
n 1P
k=1
(Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj )
and
Eum(
BjL) =
nP
k=2
um(xk)
Bk
k 1P
j=1
Aj
nP
k=2
(Bk
k 1P
j=1
Aj )
:
Notice that since Ak = 
B
n k+1 we have that
n 1P
k=1
(Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj ) =
nP
k=2
(Bk
k 1P
j=1
Aj ),
and Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj = 
B
n k+1
n kP
j=1
Aj .
Furthermore, we know that
um(xk) > um(xn k+1) if xm < 12 and xk <
1
2 or if xm >
1
2 and xk >
1
2 :
All these imply that:
a) if xm < 12 ) Eum(AjL) > Eum(BjL):
Notice that Eum(AjL) =
n 1P
k=1
um(xk)
Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj
n 1P
k=1
(Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj )
>
nP
k=2
um(xk)
Bk
k 1P
j=1
Aj
nP
k=2
(Bk
k 1P
j=1
Aj )
= Eum(
BjL)
i¤
n 1P
k=1
um(xk)
 
Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj
!
>
nP
k=2
um(xk)
 
Bk
k 1P
j=1
Aj
!
;
because
n 1P
k=1
(Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj ) =
nP
k=2
(Bk
k 1P
j=1
Aj )
that can be written as
(um(x1)  um(xn))
 
A1
nP
j=2
Bj
!
+ :::+
 
um(xn=2)  um(xn=2+1)
 
An=2
nP
j=n=2+1
Bj
!
+
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+
 
um(xn=2+1)  um(xn=2)
 
An=2+1
nP
j=n=2+2
Bj
!
+:::+(um(xn 1)  um(x2))
 
An 1Bn

> 0; because
Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj = 
B
n k+1
n kP
j=1
Aj
or we can rewrite it as
(um(x1)  um(xn))
 
A1
nP
j=2
Bj
!
+ (um(x2)  um(xn 1))
 
A2
nP
j=3
Bj   An 1Bn
!
+ :::
+
 
um(xn=2)  um(xn=2+1)
 
An=2
nP
j=n=2
Bj   An=2+1
nP
j=n=2+2
Bj
!
> 0;
which always holds because um(xk) > um(xn k+1) for k < 12 and xm <
1
2 and
Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj > 
A
n k+1
nP
j=n k+2
Bj also holds because:
Ai =
Hi 1(1 H)
1 Hn and 
B
i =
( 1
H
)i 1(1  1H )
1 ( 1
H
)n
= H
 i(H 1)
1  1
Hn
= H
n i(1 H)
1 Hn
Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj =
Hk 1(1 H)
1 Hn
nP
j=k+1
Hn j(1 H)
1 Hn =
Hk 1(1 H)2
(1 Hn)2
n k 1P
j=0
Hn j = H
k 1(1 H)
(1 Hn)2
 
1 Hn k
and
@
 
Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj
!
@k =
@

(1 H)
(1 Hn)2H
k 1(1 Hn k)

@k =
(1 H)
(1 Hn)2 (lnH)
 
Hk 1

< 0 when pL 6= pR
while
@
 
Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj
!
@k =
@

n k
n2

@k < 0
b) if xm > 12 ) Eum(AjL) < Eum(BjL), xm < 12 ) Eum(AjR) < Eum(BjR) and xm > 12 )
Eum(
AjR) < Eum(BjR):
The proof is analogous to the one above.
Therefore, if xm < 12 and we are in L the voter votes for A: Notice that xm <
1
2 is expected to occur
with probability F (xn=2). If xm >
1
2 and we are in L the voter votes for B: Again, notice that xm >
1
2 is
expected to occur with probability 1  F (xn=2). The opposite holds when we are in information set R:
That is, if candidates choose the described mixed strategies and the voter expects them to do so, the
voter is expected to vote for A with probability  when we are in I; the voter is expected to vote for
A with probability F (xn=2) when we are in L, and the voter is expected to vote for A with probability
37
1   F (xn=2) when we are in R: Notice that this is true for any mixed strategies as the ones described
above, that is, for any values of F and bS .
Going back to the reduced candidate game we conclude that the only reasonable value for pL is
F (xn=2) and the only reasonable value for pR is 1   F (xn=2). If pL = F (xn=2) and pR = 1   F (xn=2),
and F (xn=2)   then it must be the case that pL = F (xn=2)    pR = 1   F (xn=2); which implies
that H =
  F (xn=2)
  1+F (xn=2) < 0: Thus if F (xn=2)   the mixed strategy equilibrium does not exist, and the
only possibility for SE in undominated strategies left is the equilibrium in which candidates converge to
an extreme of the policy space that exists only for pL 6= pR and  2 [minfpL; pRg;maxfpL; pRg]. In this
case, when F (xn=2) >
1
2 ; we notice that we cannot have a SE in which candidates converge to the right
extreme. If there is such a SE there should be a sequence of belief systems such that
P
x2X bL(x; 1)! 1.
But F (xn=2) >
1
2 along with these beliefs imply that pL > pR and hence we should have pR    pL
(such that at least one of the two inequalities is strict). Therefore, when F (xn=2) >
1
2 we cannot have
pL    pR in any SE in undominated strategies.
This means that the only possibility of existence of an undominated SE when F (xn=2)   is if it is
such that pL    pR (with one of the two inequalities being strict). We have shown (proposition 1)
that if pL    pR (with one of the two inequalities being strict) holds then in an undominated SE
both candidates converge to the left extreme. To show that such an undominated SE exists consider the
following fully mixed strategies:
A1 = 
B
1 = 1  1 ; An = Bn = 1   ( 1)
and
Ak = 
B
k =
1
n 2(
1
)

for k =2 f1; ng and for some  > 2.
We observe that for  ! +1 we have that A1 ! 1, 
A
1
Ak
! +1 for every k di¤erent to 1 and (most
importantly) 
A
n
Ak
! +1 for every k =2 f1; ng:
Hence this strategy converges to the pure strategy 0 when  ! +1 and it is a fully mixed strategy.
If the voter has beliefs consistent with both players playing this strategy it should be the case that
bL(0; 1) = bR(1; 0) ! 1. This is because 
A
n
Ak
! +1 implies that when A o¤ers a more rightist policy
than B it is innitely more probable that they o¤er (1; 0) compared to any other policy pair. Since
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F (xn=2) >
1
2 such beliefs suggest that pL = F (xn=2) > pR = 1  F (xn=2) and, hence, an undominated SE
in which both candidates locate to the left extreme exists if F (xn=2)  . Notice that since pL    pR
(with one of the two inequalities being strict) implies that both candidates must choose the same pure
strategy (the left extreme) in an undominated SE, it follows that in any undominated SE pL  F (xn=2)
and pR  1 F (xn=2). Hence, the combination of the conditions pL    pR and pL  F (xn=2) suggests
that such a left-convergent undominated SE only if F (xn=2)  :
Proof of Proposition 3. In the end of the proof of Proposition 2 we argued that when F (xn=2) > 12
we may have  2 [minfpL; pRg;maxfpL; pRg] in a SE in undominated strategies only if   F (xn=2). So
for the case F (xn=2) <  if a SE in undominated strategies exists it should be such that  > maxfpL; pRg
or  < minfpL; pRg. Proposition 1 indicates that when  > maxfpL; pRg or  < minfpL; pRg candidates
play Ai =
Hi 1(1 H)
1 Hn and 
B
i = H
n i 1 H
1 Hn for i = 1; :::; n and H =
  pL
  pR > 0:
In the proof of Proposition 2 we have shown that if candidates play these fully mixed strategies in
a SE, it must be the case that votersbeliefs are consistent with these strategies in every information
set and, hence, that the only reasonable value for pL is F (xn=2) and the only reasonable value for pR is
1 F (xn=2). That is, the case  < minfpL; pRg is trivially ruled out and for F (xn=2) <  we have a unique
SE in undominated strategies such that
Ak = (H
)k 1 (1 H
)
1 (H)n and 
B
k = (H
)n k (1 H
)
1 (H)n for k = 1; :::; n with H
 =   F (xn=2)  1+F (xn=2) < 1:
Since this SE involves fully mixed strategies, then every information set is reached with positive
probability and, thus, the beliefs of the voter must be as follows:
bL(xi; xi0) =
Ai 
B
i0
n 1P
k=1
[Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj ]
for (xi; xi0) 2 YL;
bI(xi; xi0) =
Ai 
B
i0
nP
k=1
Ak 
B
k
for (xi; xi0) 2 YI
bR(xi; xi0) =
Ai 
B
i0
n 1P
k=1
[Bk
nP
j=k+1
Aj ]
for (xi; xi0) 2 YR:
Notice that since Ai =
(H)i 1(1 H)
1 (H)n and 
B
i =
(H)n i(1 H)
1 (H)n we have
bL(xi; xi0) =
(H)n+i i
0 1(1 H)2
1 n(H)n 1 for (xi; xi0) 2 YL;
bI(xi; xi0) =
(H)i i
0
n for (xi; xi0) 2 YI
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bR(xi; xi0) =
(H)i i
0 1(1 H)2
n 1 H+(H)n for (xi; xi0) 2 YR
Proof of Proposition 4. As in Proposition 1, it is easy to see that we cannot have a SE in undominated
strategies for  = pL = pR:
It is also easy to see that when F (xn=2) =
1
2 we cannot have  2 [minfpL; pRg;maxfpL; pRg] in a SE in
undominated strategies. In the proof of Proposition 2 we have argued that if pL    pR holds in a SE
in undominated strategies then it should also be the case that pL  F (xn=2) and that pR  1  F (xn=2):
When F (xn=2) =
1
2 ; all these conditions hold if and only if  = pL = pR =
1
2 and, hence, by the rst
argument of this proof if such a SE exists it cannot be in undominated strategies.
That is, if a SE in undominated strategies exists for the F (xn=2) =
1
2 case it must be such that
 > maxfpL; pRg or  < maxfpL; pRg: We can replicate the arguments in the proof of proposition 1, 2
and 3 and assuming that F (xn=2) =
1
2 we obtain that H
 =  F (xn=2) F (xn=2) = 1 thus, we have that 
A
i =
1
n
for i = 1; :::; n and pL = 12 = pR, Thus, as before, in equilibrium we must have that  > maxfpL; pRg:
Since this SE is fully mixed, then every information set is reached with positive probability and the
beliefs of the voter must be as follows:
bL(xi; xi0) =
Ai 
B
i0
n 1P
k=1
[Ak
nP
j=k+1
Bj ]
= 2n(n 1) for (xi; xi0) 2 YL;
bI(xi; xi0) =
Ai 
B
i0
nP
k=1
Ak 
B
k
= 1n for (xi; xi0) 2 YI
bR(xi; xi0) =
Ai 
B
i0
n 1P
k=1
[Bk
nP
j=k+1
Aj ]
= 2n(n 1) for (xi; xi0) 2 YR:
Proof of Proposition 5. Since a 2 (0; 1) we have that:
bancP
k=1
Ak (n) =
bancP
k=1
(
1  F (xn=2)
F (xn=2)
)k 1
n 1P
k=0
(
1  F (xn=2)
F (xn=2)
)k
=
bancP
k=1
(
1  F (xn=2)
F (xn=2)
)k 1
n 1P
k=0
(
1  F (xn=2)
F (xn=2)
)k
:
When n!1 we have that both limn!1
bancP
k=1
(
1  F (xn=2)
F (xn=2)
)k 1 = 1 F (xn=2)2F (xn=2) 1 and limn!1
n 1P
k=0
(
1  F (xn=2)
F (xn=2)
)k =
1 F (xn=2)
2F (xn=2) 1 for any a 2 (0; 1): Therefore,
bancP
k=1
Ak (n) ! 1 and due to symmetry of A(n) and B(n) we
have
nP
k=b(1 a)nc
Ak (n) ! 1 for any a 2 (0; 1). This implies that we arrive in information set L with
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a probability that converges to one. Moreover we know that if we are in L the voter votes for A with
probability pL = F (xn=2): Therefore, when n ! 1, A is elected with a probability which converges to
F (xn=2) >
1
2 and equivalently B is elected with a probability which converges to 1  F (xn=2) < 12 :
Proof of proposition 6. We assume F (xn=2) > 12 and consider two cases:  < F (xn=2) and  > F (xn=2).
Case 1 ( < F (xn=2)) Consider that voters beliefs are given by bI(x1; x1) = bL(x1; xn) = bR(xn; x1) =
1 whenever she is uninformed. We have seen in the proof of Proposition 2 why such beliefs can be part of
a SE. If this is the case then A(x1; x1) =  and A(xk; x1)  (1 ")(1 F (xn=2))+" for any k 6= 1. Since
 < F (xn=2) and F (xn=2) >
1
2 it trivially follows that A(xk; x1) < A(x1; x1) =  for any k 6= 1 and for
su¢ ciently small values of ". Moreover, B(x1; x1) = 1  and B(xk; x1)  (1 ")(1 F (xn=2))+" for any
k 6= 1. Since  < F (xn=2)() 1  > 1 F (xn=2) it trivially follows that B(xk; x1) < B(x1; x1) = 1 
for any k 6= 1 and for su¢ ciently small values of ". Hence, for su¢ ciently small values of " there
exists an undominated SE in which (") is such that A1 (") = B1 (") = 1 and voters beliefs are
bI(x1; x1) = bL(x1; xn) = bR(xn; x1) = 1.
Case 2 ( > F (xn=2)) Assume that the voter is expected to behave as in the unique equilibrium of
the " = 0 case whenever she is uninformed. That is, she votes for the most leftist candidate when xm < 12 ,
for the most rightist candidate when xm > 12 and, whenever we are in information set I she votes for
A with probability . We will show that this is consistent with what follows at the end of this proof.
Obviously, when the voter is informed she votes for the candidate who o¤ers the policy platform nearer
to her ideal policy and votes for A with probability  whenever she is indi¤erent between the platforms
of both candidates.
Let (") = fA("); B(")g be an equilibrium pair of strategies of the reduced game given the above
assumptions about voters behavior. Observe that the reduced game is a nite constant-sum game and
it is, thus, guaranteed to have an equilibrium and a unique equilibrium payo¤ vector for any value of ".
Moreover, it should be the case that every equilibrium strategy is a minimaximizer strategy as well. First
we will argue that if (") is an equilibrium of this reduced game then it should be that both candidates
use fully mixed strategies for " su¢ ciently small, then we will show that any equilibrium strategy prole
of this reduced game should be very close to the unique equilibrium strategy prole of the " = 0 case for
" su¢ ciently small and, nally, we will prove that the assumed voters behavior is consistent with any
equilibrium of this reduced game when " is su¢ ciently small establishing the existence of an undominated
SE which converges to the undominated SE of the standard model when "! 0+.
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Step 1 Any minimaximizer strategies A(") and B(") have full support for " su¢ ciently small.
Assume that there exists a minimaximizer strategy for candidate A, A("), such that A puts no
weight to location xj 2 X (Aj (") = 0). In this case, the payo¤ of B when A plays A(") and B plays
xj 2 X; B(A("); xj), should be at most as high as B(A("); B(")) (due to the constant-sum nature
of the reduced game). Hence, B(A("); B("))  B(A("); xj)  (1  ")(1 F (xn=2)) which implies
that lim"!0+ B(A("); B("))  1   F (xn=2). But we know that when  > F (xn=2) it is true that
lim"!0+ B(A(0); B) < 1   F (xn=2) for any possible B. That is, for su¢ ciently small values of ",
A(") cannot be a minimaximizer for A because it gives a payo¤ to B which converges to something at
least as high as 1   F (xn=2) while if A used A(0) then, as " approaches zero, the payo¤ of B would
converge to something strictly less than 1   F (xn=2): So, for " su¢ ciently small, any minimaximizer
strategy of candidate A, A("), should have full support.
Now, assume that there exists a minimaximizer strategy for candidate B, B("), such that B puts
no weight to location x1 2 X (B1 (") = 0). Then, since  > F (xn=2) it is obvious that A(x1; B(")) <
A(x2; 
B(")) for any ". That is, A puts no weight to location x1 2 X too; this contradicts the above.
So B puts positive weight to location x1. Now consider that B(") is such that B puts no weight to
location xj 2 X (Bj (") = 0) for some j > 1.
Then:
A(xj ; 
B("))  (1  ")[(1  F (xn=2))
j 1P
k=1
Bk (") + F (xn=2)
nP
k=j+1
Bk (")] + ":
That is, for " su¢ ciently small, A(xj ; B(")) < F (xn=2): But we know that A(A(0); B(")) con-
verges to something strictly larger than F (xn=2) when " approaches zero. So A puts no weight to location
xj 2 X too; this contradicts what we found above. That is, for " su¢ ciently small, any minimaximizer
strategies A(") and B(") should have full support.
Step 2 A(")! A(0) and B(")! B(0) when "! 0+.
Since this reduced game is constant sum it must be the case thatA(A("); B("))! A(A(0); B(0))
(and B(A("); B("))! B(A(0); B(0))) when "! 0+. To see why this holds, assume for example
that lim"!0+ A(A("); B(")) > A(A(0); B(0)) (lim"!0+ B(A("); B(")) < B(A(0); B(0))).
Then ifB uses B(0) he should get a payo¤which converges to something at least as high asB(A(0); B(0))
when "! 0+; B(") cannot be a minimaximizer strategy and, thus, part of an equilibrium.
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We proceed now to the main argument. Assume that there exists a minimaximizer strategy for
candidate A, A("), such that lim"!0+ A1 (") > A1 (0) (the proof for the lim"!0+ A1 (") < A1 (0)
case is symmetric). Then, since any minimaximizer strategies A(") and B(") have full support for
" su¢ ciently small it must be the case that lim"!0+ B(A("); x1) = lim"!0+ B(A("); B(")) <
B(
A("); B(0)). So, A1 (") ! A1 (0) when " ! 0+: Now assume that lim"!0+ A2 (") > A2 (0)
(the proof for the lim"!0+ A2 (") < A2 (0) case is symmetric). Since A1 (") ! A1 (0) when " ! 0+ it
must be the case that lim"!0+ B(A("); x2) = lim"!0+ B(A("); B(")) < B(A("); B(0)). So,
A2 (") ! A2 (0) when " ! 0+:We continue in the same fashion step by step until the last location and
we show that Aj (")! Aj (0) when "! 0+ for any j: The proof for why Bj (")! Bj (0) when "! 0+
for any j is equivalent.
Step 3 When " ! 0+ and when the voter expects that the candidates play A(") ! A(0) and
B(")! B(0); conditional on being uninformed, the probability that the voter votes for A is F (xn=2)
when we are in the information set L and 1  F (xn=2) when we are in the information set R.
For any even n, when the voter is uninformed and she expects that the candidates chose A(0) and
B(0) we know that:
Eum(
A(0)jL) > Eum(B(0)jL) and Eum(B(0)jR) > Eum(A(0)jR) if xm < 12 and
Eum(
A(0)jL) < Eum(B(0)jL) and Eum(B(0)jR) < Eum(A(0)jR) if xm > 12 :
By continuity of Eum(QjS) in Q for any Q 2 fA;Bg and S 2 fL;R; Ig it follows that when
(")! (0) we should have Eum(Q(")jS)! Eum(Q(0)jS) for any Q 2 fA;Bg and S 2 fL;R; Ig:
That is, all the above strict inequalities should be maintained for " su¢ ciently small and, thereafter, the
probability that the voter votes for a specic candidate conditional on being uninformed should remain
unchanged too.
Proof of proposition 7. Notice that when xm 2 f0; 1g then independently of whether the voter is
perfectly or imperfectly informed about the policy platforms of the candidates or not, her choice is always
the same, that is, even if she is imperfectly informed she votes for the candidate she would have voted for if
she had perfect information. To see this consider an imperfectly informed voter with xm = 0 and assume
that we are in L. Then the voter knows that the policy candidate A o¤ers gives her a strictly larger utility
than the policy candidate B o¤ers and correctly votes for A. The voter makes an equivalently correct
choice when we are in information set R (she knows that candidate B o¤ers a better policy compared to
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the one o¤ered by A). And, obviously, she also makes the same choice in both cases when we are in I
(she votes for the advantaged candidate A). So when the voter has imperfect information her behavior
may be di¤erent from the perfect information case only when xm = 12 :
Assume that when the voter is imperfectly informed and xm = 12 then she votes for the advantaged
candidate A in any of the three information sets. If this is the case then obviously pL = pR = 2=3:
Assume that an equilibrium in mixed strategies exist for the policy selection subgame in which both
candidates place a positive weight at all three policies. Let A
 
A("); B(")

denote the expected
payo¤ of candidate A when candidates use the assumed mixed strategies and the candidates expect
pL = pR = 2=3. Then we should have:
 A  0; B(") = B1 (") + B2 (")[(1  ")23 + "13 ] + B3 (")[(1  ")23 + "23 ]
 A  12 ; B(")) = B1 (")[(1  ")23 + "23 ] + B2 (") + B3 (")[(1  ")23 + "23 ]
 A  1; B(") = B1 (")[(1  ")23 + "23 ] + B2 (")[(1  ")23 + "13 ] + B3 (")
and
 B  A("); 0 = A2 (")[(1  ")13 + "13 ] + A3 (")[(1  ")13 + "13 ]
 B  A("); 12 = A1 (")[(1  ")13 + "23 ] + A3 (")[(1  ")13 + "23 ]
 B  A("); 1 = A1 (")[(1  ")13 + "13 ] + A2 (")[(1  ")13 + "13 ]
In equilibrium we must have that A
 
x; B(")

= A
 
A("); B(")

for all x. Moreover we know
that A1 (") + A2 (") + A3 (") = 1 and B1 (") + B2 (") + B3 (") = 1: We solve the system and we get
the unique solution:
A1 (") = A3 (") =
1
3+2" ; 
A
2 (") =
1+2"
3+2" and 
B
1 (") = 
B
3 (") =
1+"
3+2" ; 
B
2 (") =
1
3+2" :
If another equilibrium existed in the policy selection subgame then (using the arguments of the proof
of proposition 2) it should be the case that innitely many mixed equilibria with full support should exist.
This would contradict the existence of a unique solution for the system we have just solved.
Thus, the policy selection subgame admits a unique equilibrium. To conclude the proof that the SE
that we describe actually exists we only need to argue that when the voter is imperfectly informed and
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xm =
1
2 she always votes for A. Due to the fact that both in L and in R candidate A is more likely to be
o¤ering policy 12 than candidate B it is straightforward that she prefers to vote for A.
In order to show that this the unique optimal behavior for the voter, suppose that when the voter is
imperfectly informed and xm = 12 she does not always vote for A: Then, there are a few possibilities: i)
she always votes for B, ii) she votes for A when we are in L and for B when we are in R and iii) she votes
for B when we are in L and for A when we are in R: We can repeat the same steps that we performed
when we assumed that she always votes for A and we can show that the strategies that the candidates
choose in the equilibrium of the policy selection subgame are inconsistent with each of these three new
assumptions (cases i), ii) and ii))
Proof of proposition 8 . Consider without loss of generality that F (xn=2)  12 . First of all, it is straight-
forward to see that in the conventional advantage game E

um (xA) : bI(xA;xB)

> E

um (xB) : bI(xA;xB)

for any bI(xA;xB) and any d > 0. That is the voter always votes for A when we are in information set I.
Now, lets dene  = minfminf (jxi   x1j)    (jxi+1   x1j) ji = 1; 2; :::; n   1g [minf (jxi+1   xnj)  
 (jxi   xnj) ji = 1; 2; :::; n   1gg. It is clear that for any strictly decreasing () it must be the case
that  > 0. This implies that if xm = x1 and d 2 (0; ) the voter will vote for B in information set
R and for A in information set L for any belief system (bL; bI ; bR). Since F has full support all the
above suggest that (pL; pR) 2 (minff(x1); f(xn)g; 1   minff(x1); f(xn)g)2 and pI = 1 when d 2 (0; ).
By the arguments of the proof of proposition 1 it is clear that for any belief system which induces
(pL; pR) 2 (minff(x1); f(xn)g; 1   minff(x1); f(xn)g)2 and pI = 1 there is a unique equilibrium in the
candidates reduced game. Now since both pL and pR are bounded from below by a strictly positive
number and from above by a positive number strictly lower than one it must be the case that for any
such pL and pR the unique equilibrium of the reduced game is such that, for some d > 0, when xm < 12
we must have:
E(jxA   xmj jL)  E(jxB   xmj jL) > d and E(jxB   xmj jR)  E(jxA   xmj jR) > d
and when xm > 12 we must have:
E(jxB   xmj jL)  E(jxA   xmj jL) > d
E(jxA   xmj jR)  E(jxB   xmj jR) > d:
Hence, by Eum(AjS) = E(jxA   xmj jS) + d and by continuity of Eum(AjS) in d it directly
follows that there exists d^(n; F ) > 0 such that for every d 2 (0; d^(n; F )] any belief system (bL; bI ; bR)
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induces a unique equilibrium in the reduced game which in turn induces pL = 1  pR = F (xn=2). That is,
for su¢ ciently low values of the advantage the conventional advantage game admits a unique SE which
coincides with the unique SE of our game for  = 1:
9 Appendix 2 (odd number of policies)
When n is odd, one obtains essentially the same results with the following modications. The relevant
threshold of  2 [12 ; 1] which determines whether we are in the pure strategy equilibrium case or in the
mixed strategy no longer relates to F (xn=2) but to F (xn 1
2
) and to 1  F (xn+1
2
) instead.
A) For F (xn 1
2
) > 1  F (xn+1
2
) we have that:
A.1) if   F (xn 1
2
) + f(xn+1
2
) then there exists an essentially unique undominated SE in pure
strategies, such that both candidates converge to x = 0.
A.2) if  > F (xn 1
2
) + f(xn+1
2
) then there exists a unique undominated SE in mixed strategies, such
that the advantaged candidate assigns most of its probability to x = 0 and the disadvantaged candidate
concentrates on x = 1. In specic both candidates mix according to the strategies presented in proposition
3 with the modication that in this case H =
  F (xn 1
2
) f(xn+1
2
)
  1+F (xn+1
2
) f(xn+1
2
) < 1.
B) For F (xn 1
2
) < 1  F (xn+1
2
) we have that:
B.1) if   1   F (xn+1
2
) + f(xn+1
2
) then there exists an essentially unique undominated SE in pure
strategies, such that both candidates converge to x = 1.
B.2) if  > 1   F (xn+1
2
) + f(xn+1
2
) then there exists a unique undominated SE in mixed strategies,
such that the advantaged candidate assigns most of its probability to x = 1 and the disadvantaged
candidate concentrates on x = 0. In specic both candidates mix according to the strategies presented in
proposition 3 with the modication that in this case H =
  F (xn 1
2
) f(xn+1
2
)
  1+F (xn+1
2
) f(xn+1
2
) > 1.
C) Finally suppose that F (xn 1
2
) = 1  F (xn+1
2
). In this case, we have that   F (xn 1
2
) + f(xn+1
2
)
must always hold because  > 12 implies 

1  f(xn+1
2
)

> F (xn 1
2
); thus we have that.
C.1) if  = F (xn 1
2
) + f(xn+1
2
) then there is no undominated SE (notice that this can only hold for
 = 12)
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C.2) if  > F (xn 1
2
) + f(xn+1
2
) there exists a unique undominated SE in which candidates mix
uniformly exactly as in proposition 4.
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Figure 1a. Partition induced by the signals. 
Figure 1b. Beliefs corresponding to different signals. 
Figure 1c.  Example of support of beliefs for different signals. 
Figure 2a. Equilibrium mixed strategies for 6.0)( 2/ ?nxF , 1??  and 6?n .
Figure 2b. Equilibrium mixed strategies for 6.0)( 2/ ?nxF , 1??  and 12?n .
Figure 2c. Equilibrium mixed strategies for 6.0)( 2/ ?nxF , 1??  and 36?n .
Figure 2d. Equilibrium mixed strategies for 6.0)( 2/ ?nxF , 1??  and 54?n .
Figure 3a. Equilibrium payoff of candidate A  as a function of ?  for 6?n  and
.6.0)( 2/ ?nxF
Figure 3b. Equilibrium payoff of candidate A  as a function of ?  for 200?n  and
.6.0)( 2/ ?nxF
Figure 4a. Equilibrium beliefs for information set L  for 6.0)( 2/ ?nxF , 1??  and 
10?n .
Figure 4b. Equilibrium beliefs for information set R  for 6.0)( 2/ ?nxF , 1??  and 
10?n .
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